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Abstract: Resolving legal problems at the national and European level, legal
principles are of outstanding significance. However, it often remains unclear how
to utilise these legal principles – which are partly not codified – in the specific
legal solution. This article addresses two questions: How can we derive legal
principles from the law if they have not been codified in the law? Moreover, how
can we concretise legal principles? These two main issues will be illustrated on
the basis of contractual freedom and particular legal institutes such as obligation
to contract, price control, and frustration of contract. A last issue will be to tackle
methodical difficulties posed by legal principles at the European level.
Résumé: Dans la solution de problèmes juridiques aux niveaux national et
européen, les principes de droit ont une importance singulière. Cependant, il
n’est pas toujours facile de savoir comment se servir concrètement de ces prin-
cipes, qui ne sont pas toujours codifiés. Cet article tente de répondre à deux
questions. Comment induire des principes du corps normatif alors qu’ils n’ont pas
été codifiés ? Comment les rendre concrets ? Les réponses sont illustrées par
référence à la liberté contractuelle et divers mécanismes comme l’obligation de
contracter, le contrôle des prix ou la force majeure. Il restera alors à envisager les
difficultés d’ordre méthodologique soulevées par les principes juridiques au
niveau européen.
Zusammenfassung: Rechtsprinzipien haben auf nationaler und auf europäischer
Ebene eine herausragende Bedeutung bei der Lösung von Rechtsproblemen. Wie
diese Rechtsprinzipien, die zum Teil nicht kodifiziert sind, für die konkrete
Rechtslösung herangezogen werden können, bleibt aber oft unklar. Dieser Artikel
befasst sich mit zwei Fragen: Wie lassen sich Rechtsprinzipien aus dem Recht
ableiten, wenn sie gesetzlich nicht niedergeschrieben sind? Zudem ist zu erörtern,
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wie Rechtsprinzipien konkretisiert werden können. Beide Hauptprobleme sollen
anhand der Vertragsfreiheit und einzelner Rechtsinstitute wie Kontrahierungs-
zwang, Preiskontrolle und Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage veranschaulicht wer-
den. Abschließend soll methodologischen Schwierigkeiten mit Rechtsprinzipien
auf europäischer Ebene nachgegangen werden.
I Introduction
In our society, being principled is usually seen as a positive character trait. If a
person remains true to his principles, he is considered to be strong-willed,
sincere, and straightforward. In this respect, politicians and elected representa-
tives are far too often prematurely assumed to put honest convictions aside in
favour of securing power and influence or acting opportunistically in the interests
of the strongest lobby at the time, and against the interests of the sovereign
people. According to Gandhi, ‘politics without principles’ even represents one of
his famous seven deadly sins of modern society.1 It is therefore hardly a new
insight that both our man-made Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany
(GG) and the ordinary law are permeated with numerous principles which are
meant to ensure that the law is as straightforward as possible.
However, it is all the more astonishing that only a few of these legal principles
are set out in positive law. For example, little is recorded in writing on the
principle in the law of obligations of freedom of contract2 in the German Civil
Code (BGB) as well as on the principle of contractual fidelity (pacta sunt servan-
da).3However, the existence and applicability of these principles are not seriously
disputed. Scholars assume unanimously that the BGB presupposes these princi-
1 Gandhi, ‘Seven Social Sins’ Young India (22 October 1925 (no 43)) 361: ‘politics without princi-
ples’.
2 The term is even referred to in the Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches für
das Deutsche Reich (ie travaux preparatoire for the first draft of the German Civil Code) volume II
(1896) 2: ‘By virtue of the principle of freedom of contract, which governs the law of contractual
obligations, the parties can determine their legal relationships and associations between them-
selves at their discretion with binding effect, insofar as there are no conflicting general or specific
individual absolute legal provisions’.
3 In contrast, the principle was even found in the original Article 77 of the Entwurfe eines
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches für das Deutsche Reich (ie Draft of a Civil Code for the German Reich)
(1888): ‘In order to conclude a contract, it is necessary for the contracting parties to declare their
corresponding intentions to each other’; This Article 77 was then deleted by the second commis-
sion, see Commission’s Report, 156, in B. Mugdan, Die gesammten Materialien des Bürgerlichen
Gesetzbuchs für das Deutsche Reich, volume I (1899) 688.
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ples as simply being obviously valid.4 In contrast to German law, other states
have codified numerous principles.5
However, there are also explicitly listed legal principles in German law. The
Basic Law contains the most well-known ones: fundamental rights are principles
par excellence. At the European level, it is particularly important to mention the
fundamental freedoms set out in the TFEU and the DCFR. The mere fact that legal
principles dominate our highest-ranking codifications shows their enormous
importance in reaching legally sound decisions, and thus forces legal scholars to
discuss them.
This article deals with the question of whether and how legal principles can
be applied in German private law to resolve questions of law. The purpose of legal
methodology is to clarify how legal principles affect the resolution of a case and
how they can be harnessed for this purpose. The main area of application of
methodological work with legal principles is for instances where the law does not
contain an answer, or at least does not contain a clear answer, to a legal problem.
If there is a gap, a court has to decide such unresolved issues in the last resort.
The judge is obligated to make a decision.6 Moreover, s/he cannot simply decide,
but rather needs to be able to justify the decision rationally with good arguments.7
For this purpose, as part of an extensive methodological arsenal, the judge can
utilise the appraisals of existing law, and develop a solution therefrom. In
4 Thus W. Flume, ʻRechtsgeschäft und Privatautonomie’, in Festschrift 100 Jahre Deutscher Jur-
istentag, volume I (Karlsruhe: Müller, 1960) 135, 136 et seq; W. Flume, Allgemeiner Teil des
Bürgerlichen Rechts, Das Rechtsgeschäft, volume 2 (Berlin: Springer, 1965) sec 1.1, 1; agreeing
C.-W. Canaris, ‘Wandlungen des Schuldvertragrechts – Tendenzen zu einer «Materialisierung»’
Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 200 (2000) 273, 277; R. Bork, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen
Gesetzbuchs (4th ed, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016) para 99.
5 For pacta sunt servanda see for instance fn 75; for the violation of moral principles see fn 69.
6 L. Enneccerus and H. C. Nipperdey, Lehrbuch des Bürgerlichen Rechts (15th ed, Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 1960) 336; A. Meier-Hayoz, ‘Strategische und taktische Aspekte der Fortbildung des
Rechts’, JuristenZeitung 1981, 417; B. Rüthers, Ch. Fischer and A. Birk, Rechtstheorie mit juris-
tischer Methodenlehre (8th ed, Munich: C H Beck, 2015) para 314; see also K. Larenz, Methoden-
lehre der Rechtswissenschaft (6th ed, Berlin: Springer, 1991) 368, 402; Historically on the so-called
prohibition on denying justice see E. Schumann, ‘Das Rechtsverweigerungsverbot’ Zeitschrift für
Zivilprozess 81 (1968) 79, 83 et seq; M.Th. Fögen, ʻSchrittmacher des Rechts: Anmerkungen zum
Justiz- und Rechtsverweigerungsverbot’, in Festschrift Kramer (Basel et al: Helbing & Lichten-
hahn, 2004) 3 et seq.
7 On the obligation to give reasons, German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG), decision of
19 May 1992, 1 BvR 986/91, BVerfGE 86, 133, 144 et seq; see from the ordinary law, sec 30(1)
German Federal Constitutional Court Act (BVerfGG); sec 313(1) no 6(3) Code of Civil Procedure
(ZPO); sec 267(1), 275 Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO) or sec 117(2) no 5 Rules of the Adminis-
trative Courts (VwGO); sec 60(2), 4, 96(2) Labour Courts Act (ArbGG).
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particular, in addition to the option to interpret existing laws, jurisprudence also
has the power to develop the law.8 Judges must therefore inevitably pose the
question of how to resolve a legal problem in the spirit of the existing law if there
is no written rule. S/he therefore has to explore existing appraisals of the law and
harness them to resolve the specific legal problem.
A line of argument based on principles therefore gains its power of persua-
sion solely therefrom.9 Principles represent stability in law, legal certainty, and
transparency. Principles also seem difficult to rebut; they have a superordinate
character compared with individual specific legal provisions. It is difficult to
oppose them, unless one can claim that the circumstances are sufficient for there
to be an exception to the principle. However, one who claims such special
circumstances bears the burden of argumentation.
In addition to these advantages of reasoning with legal principles, however,
there is also a risk that the mere reference to a principle replaces the deeper
analysis of the specific case and its circumstances, and thus the justice of the
individual case is left out of consideration. Decisive aspects of the individual case,
which could force a decision that deviates from the principle, are in danger of
being overlooked. Furthermore, the fact that legal principles are often uncodified
can lead to a temptation to ‘invent’ new legal principles without sufficient
connection to the existing law. Moreover, without precise determination of their
scope, particularly for unregulated legal problems, it opens the door to decisions
lacking transparent justification, that is, ultimately, arbitrariness.
It is therefore necessary to identify legal principles from a methodological
point of view, and to clarify the question as to whether and how they can be
applied to resolve the specific case without constitutional objections. First, a
conceptual and characterising delimitation and narrowing is required (II). Then,
the prerequisites for developing and forming legal principles must be clarified
(III). The focus then turns to the application of legal principles as a methodologi-
cal construction in the specific individual case (IV). Eventually, a methodological
consideration of legal principles at the European level is required (V).
8 Explicitly BVerfG, decision of 14 February 1973, 1 BvR 112/65, BVerfGE 34, 269, 286 et seq –
Soraya; BVerfG, decision of 8 April 1987, 2 BvR 687/85, BVerfGE 75, 223, 243 et seq – Kloppenburg.
9 Similar Y. Adar and P. Sirena, ‘Principles and Rules in the Emerging European Contract Law:
From the PECL to the CESL, and Beyond’ 9 European Review of Contract Law 1, 8 et seq (2013).
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II What characterises a Legal Principle?
1 The Concept of the Legal Principle
A definition of the ‘general legal principle’ (synonymously ‘principle’) must
include various components. In the same way that legal doctrine is more than
the law,10 so are legal principles more than the legal norms of the laws. Le-
gal principles develop from the totality of the written and unwritten legal
norms.
The term ‘legal principle’ or the synonymous term ‘general legal principle’ is
rarely clarified. Larenz described principles as guiding criteria of legal standardi-
sation, which are able to justify decisions on the basis of their own persuasive-
ness.11 However, this description is fairly vague, and does not allow any distinc-
tion from the legal concept and the legal rule. In Germany, Esser fundamentally
advanced the distinction between norms (Rechtssätze) and principles. He charac-
terised principles as pre-positive law that influences the interpretation of norms
and therefore is transformed to a more concrete level.12 Dworkin established the
almost generally accepted distinction between rules and principles.13 He identi-
fied principles as norms which –without being rules – can serve as arguments for
individual rights.14 Building on Dworkin and Esser, scholars refined and modified
the doctrine of principles in detail.15 However, they all share the opinion that rules
are either met or not, and thus prescribe a decision.16 Principles, by contrast,
10 Here A. Voßkuhle, in W. Hoffmann-Riem, E. Schmidt-Aßmann and A. Voßkuhle, Grundlagen
des Verwaltungsrechts, volume 1 (2nd ed, Munich: C H Beck, 2012) sec 1 para 6; see the various
conceptualisations for Ch. Waldhoff, in G. Kirchhof, S. Magen and K. Schneider, Was weiß Dog-
matik? (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012) 17, 22 et seq; Ch. Möllers, in Hoffmann-Riem, Schmidt-
Aßmann and Voßkuhle, this note above, sec 3 para 35 et seq.
11 Larenz, n 6 above, 421.
12 J. Esser,Grundsatz und Norm in der richterlichen Fortbildung des Privatrechts (Tübingen: Mohr,
1956) 94.
13 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge/Mass: Harvard University Press, 1978) 23 et
seq.
14 Dworkin, n 13 above, 90.
15 Eg C. W. Canaris, Systemdenken und Systembegriff in der Jurisprudenz (2nd ed, Berlin: Duncker
& Humblot, 1983) 52 et seq; R. Alexy, ‘Rechtsregeln und Rechtprinzipien’ Archiv für Rechts- und
Sozialphilosophie Beiheft 25 (1985) 13, 15 et seq; Adar and Sirena, n 9 above, 13 et seq, who hold for
the legitimizing function of principles to be themost important characteristic of principles.
16 Dworkin, n 13 above, 24 et seq; R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp,
1986) 76 (english: Theory of Constitutional Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Alexy,
n 15 above, 20.
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cannot absolutely specify a decision because they must be balanced with other
principles.17 To resolve a problem, principles can only be useful after concretisa-
tion.18 They also require substantiation, because they are not yet classifiable as
such.19 In this respect, principles are (only) optimisation requirements which can
be fulfilled to various degrees and be incorporated into the decision.20 As optimi-
sation requirements they do not permit any resolution of the decision but rather
support decision-making.21 Large parts of the literature, however, are critical of
the absoluteness of this theory’s claim to differentiate rules from principles.22 The
distinction between principles and rules cannot be derived from the Basic Law.23
It is also unclear when a norm is a principle and when it is a rule.24 The distinction
between principles and rules is often a gradual one.25
After all, a definition of a legal principle must contain at least three compo-
nents:26
(1.) Legal principles or (often used synonymously) principles of law are
initially only partly standardised and often not set out in law at all. They are
extracted from the legal system as the totality of the written and unwritten legal
norms and are more than legal concepts.
17 Dworkin, n 13 above, 26.
18 Canaris, n 15 above, 57.
19 E. A. Kramer, JuristischeMethodenlehre (5th ed, Munich: C H Beck, 2016) 275 et seq.
20 Alexy, n 15 above, 19; Alexy, n 16 above, 75 et seq; R. Alexy, ‘Rechtssystem und Praktische
Vernunft’ Rechtstheorie 18 (1987) 405, 407, agreeing Larenz, n 6 above, 475; N. Jansen, Die
Struktur der Gerechtigkeit (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998) 106 et seq; A. Röthel,Normkonkretisierung
(Tübingen:Mohr Siebeck, 2004) 146 et seq, 225 et seq.
21 Vividly D. Merten, Handbuch der Grundrechte, volume III (Heidelberg: Müller, 2009) sec 68
para 25; as above Alexy, n 15 above, 15 et seq; Larenz, n 6 above, 474.
22 U. di Fabio,Das Recht offener Staaten (Tübingen:Mohr Siebeck, 1998) 69; J. F. Lindner, Theorie
der Grundrechtsdogmatik (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005) 54: ‘(...) the norm theory approach has
not established itself’; J. H. Klement, ‘Vom Nutzen einer Theorie, die alles erkärt’ JuristenZeitung
2008, 756 et seq; J. H. Klement, ‘Schlusswort’, JuristenZeitung 2009, 560 et seq and the authors in
the following footnotes.
23 Lindner, n 22 above, 54.
24 M. Sachs, in K. Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, volume III/1 (Munich:
C H Beck, 1988) 502; M. Jestaedt,Grundrechtsentfaltung im Gesetz (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999)
214; M. Jestaedt, ʻDie Abwägungslehre: ihre Stärken und ihre Schwächen’, in Festschrift Isensee
(Heidelberg: Müller, 2007) 253, 261; Klement (2008), n 22 above, 760.
25 M. Auer, Materialisierung, Flexibilisierung, Richterfreiheit (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005) 48,
135.
26 Adar and Sirena, n 9 above, 8 et seq name six components.
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(2.) They allow a certain generalisation.27 Principles form ‘the deep structure
of the law’.28 They generally claim normative validity and lead to a presumption
of conformity.29
(3.) However, principles are frequently not classifiable and require further
specification through legal rules or balancing. Or in the words of Bydlinski: ‘They
are thus guiding principles and grounds of justification of a legal provision, but
not the positive provision itself.’30 Canaris illustrates: ‘Principles unfold their true
meaning foremost by interacting in mutual addition and restriction.’
2 Differentiation from Legal Concepts and Legal Doctrine
Legal concepts have a higher status than legal principles. They provide reasons
for norms which formulate the requirements or prohibitions.31 Such legal con-
cepts, which are to some extent also referred to as values,32 are of a higher level of
abstraction, and frequently too general to be used to resolve a case. Legal
concepts, such as justice, expediency, and legal certainty, must therefore also be
further specified to make it possible to have transparent, persuasive trains of
thought and justification. Otherwise there is a risk that the concept is only used as
an empty phrase.33
Legal principles require further specification to be applicable for the specific
case. A legal rule can exist in a legal doctrine developed by jurisprudence, such
as the obligation to contract. A legal doctrine in its application is then eventually
a rule in the sense of Alexy or a positive rule in the sense of Bydlinski. In the
27 J. Basedow, ‘Das BGB im künftigen europäischen Privatrecht: Der hybride Kodex’ Archiv für
die civilistische Praxis 200 (2000) 446, 453. In detail, also C.-W. Canaris, Die Feststellung von
Lücken im Gesetz (2nd ed, Berlin: Duncker &Humblot, 1983) 47 et seq.
28 K. F. Röhl andH.Ch. Röhl,Allgemeine Rechtslehre (3rd ed, Cologne: Heymanns, 2008) 283.
29 Röhl and Röhl, n 28 above, 284.
30 F. Bydlinski, Juristische Methodenlehre und Rechtsbegriff (2nd ed, Vienna et al: Springer, 1991)
132.
31 M. Mahlmann, Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie (3rd ed, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015)
sec 24 para 13.
32 W. Fikentscher,Methoden des Rechts, volume IV (Tübingen:Mohr, 1977) 394 et seq.
33 This particularly applies for the concept of the ‘nature of the matter’. See H. Dernburg,
Pandekten, volume 1 (7th ed, 1902) 84; H. Dernburg, System des römischen Rechts, volume 1 (8th
ed, 1911) sec 32.2, 64; A. von Thur, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerliches Rechts, volume 1 (1910) 42;
A. Kaufmann, Analogie und “Natur der Sache” (2nd ed, Heidelberg: von Decker, 1982); F. Müller,
Normstruktur und Normativität (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1966) 94 et seq; Larenz, n 6 above,
417 et seqwith citations; Canaris, n 27 above, 100.
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interim it is substantiated and has also acquired a binding character through the
development of tangible, directly classifiable features. Thus, for example, liability
for apparent rights is established as a legal principle from Sections 171, 172 BGB
and Section 405 BGB. This principle is then developed into the legal doctrine of
agency by estoppel34 and apparent authority.35
III The Derivation and Substantiation of Legal
Principles
1 The Derivation of unwritten Legal Principles
If a principle is codified, the question of its derivation is unnecessary. Here, the
only question is when a law can be ‘elevated’ into a legal principle, and thus has a
ripple effect on other provisions, must be taken into consideration for their inter-
pretation, or can serve as the basis for further development of the law in the area
of law concerned. First, there is the possibility that the law itself ascribes to a legal
rule the status of a legal principle. Article 5(1) Sentence 1(3) TEU, for example,
explicitly speaks of the principle of conferral and of the principle of subsidiarity.
In German law, on the other hand, one rarely finds such clear statements.36
a) Historical Derivation
It is more difficult to derive legal principles which are not explicitly stated. In
large parts of the ordinary law this is actually the case. In part, legal principles
are explained from a historical perspective.37 There is no doubt that numerous
34 Federal Supreme Court (BGH), Judgment of 15 October 1987, III ZR 235/86, BGHZ 102, 60, 64;
then without the doctrinal derivation: BGH, Judgment of 11 May 2011, VIII ZR 289/09, BGHZ 189,
346 para 15 – use of a third-party eBaymember’s account.
35 BGH, Judgment of 20 January 1983, VII ZR 32/82, BGHZ 86, 273, 274 et seq – apparent
authority.
36 For example, critical of the ‘General Principles’ set out in section 3 German Securities Acquisi-
tion and Takeover Act (WpÜG), P. Versteegen, in Kölner Kommentar zum WpÜG (2nd ed, Cologne:
Heymanns, 2010) sec 3 para 2: Declared aims, use of which is questionable; U. Noack and T. Holz-
born, in E. Schwark and D. Zimmer, Kapitalmarktrechtskommentar (4th ed, Munich: C H Beck,
2010) sec 3 para 1.
37 See the examples in J. Esser, Grundsatz und Norm (4th ed, Tübingen: Mohr, 1990) 317 et seq;
J. Rückert, in Historisch-kritischer Kommentar zum BGB (HKK-BGB) (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck,
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legal principles come from centuries of tradition, in some cases even millen-
nia.38 Legal constructions such as the prohibition in laesio enormis or clausula
rebus sic stantibus can only provide initial approaches to justify the current
principles of law or legal rules. On closer inspection, however, one will find
that many legal principles have developed over the centuries. Because the
conditions change the comparison with historical examples is not always
convincing.39 Ultimately, the necessary flexibility would not be achieved by
forming new principles if these were derived exclusively from the past.40 Legal
doctrine, correctly understood, does not remain in the jurisprudence of con-
cepts, but rather changes with the requirements of the legislation and the case
law.41
2003) with sec 1 para 80 et seq; and R. Zimmermann, Law of Obligations (Cape Town: Juta, 1992);
R. Zimmermann, ‘Das römisch-kanonische ius commune als Grundlage europäischer Rechtsein-
heit’ JuristenZeitung 1992, 8 et seq; R. Zimmermann, ‘Heardmelodies are sweet, but those unheard
are sweeter...’ Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 193 (1993) 121 et seq, who calls for a European ius
commune.
38 See, for example Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics, 5th Book, 4–9 (Justice and Fairness); art 104 et
seq Constitutio Criminalis Carolina (CCC) of 27 July 1532 (Principle of Legality); Ch. von Wolff,
Grundsätze des Natur- und Völkerrechts (1754) sec 438: ‘When two or more jointly agree on one or
more promises, it is a contract (pactum or pactio).’ (pacta sunt servanda); Ulp D 1.1.10.1.: ‘Juris
praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere’ (alterum non
laedere).
39 See only the various groups of cases of frustration of contract which have developed in the
course of time in the case law. For example, the overview in Ch. Grüneberg, in Palandt BGB
(77th ed, Munich: C H Beck, 2018) sec 313 para 25 et seq.
40 Critical against Zimmermann (1992, Law of Obligation), n 37 above, for example, D. Simon,
‘Zwillingsschwestern und Stammesbrüder oder What is What?’ Rechtshistorisches Journal 11
(1992) 574, 577 et seq; W. Wiegand, ‘Back to the future?’ Rechtshistorisches Journal 12 (1993) 277 et
seq; F. Kübler, ‘Traumpfade oder Holzwege nach Europa?’ Rechtshistorisches Journal 12 (1993)
307, 310 et seq.
41 Thus R. von Jhering, Geist des römischen Rechts, volume 1 (4th ed, 1878) 14: ʻThrough Roman
law, but beyond itʼ; here W. Fikentscher,Methoden des Rechts, volume II (Tübingen: Mohr, 1976)
165. On the necessary flexibility, see W. Brohm, Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen
Staatsrechtslehrer (VVDStRL) 30 (1972) 245, 249; U. Volkmann, JuristenZeitung 2005, 261, 262 et
seq.
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b) Induction: the systematic and evaluative Comparison of the Development of
new General Legal Principles
It therefore seems more convincing to derive principles directly from the value
judgements of the law. Literature also favours induction to derive legal principles,
namely, reasoning from the specific to the general.42
The systematic derivation of a general legal principle can happen in at least
three ways: Firstly, the principle is sometimes found in a provision which is too
restrictive. It can then be extended beyond the original application of the norm to
other cases. It is generally accepted that the provision in Section 254 BGB on
contributory negligence in the law on damages is considered a legal principle,
and the concept of contributory negligence is understood in non-technical terms.
Those who disregard the necessary duty of care when one of their legal interests
is harmed breach an obligation, along with the actual injuring party. They are
then accused of ‘culpability to themselves’, so that it would be unconscionable to
claim full compensation.43 The provision also applies for strict liability44 which
does not require any fault at all. Moreover, the provision in Section 254 BGB is
even referred to outside of the law on damages, eg for the claim for compensation
under neighbourhood law in Section 906(2) Sentence 2 BGB45 or for the claim for
disposal in Section 1004 BGB.46 The principle also applies in public law.47
Secondly, the principle can be extracted from a single provision.48 This
applies, for example, to the principle of good faith in Section 242 BGB.49 Funda-
mental rights are referred to as legal principles and also arise from a single legal
provision.
42 In detail on this, see Aristotle, Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, or Lehre vom Schluss (Edition
Kirchmann, 1877) 23rd ch 142; Bacon,NovumOrganum, Book I (1620) aphorismus CIV, 82.
43 BGH, Judgment of 18 April 1997, V ZR 28/96, BGHZ 135, 235, 240 – roots in the tennis court.
44 BGH, Judgment of 23 June 1952, III 297/51, BGHZ 6, 319, 320 – obligation to pay compensation
between motorists; BGH, Judgment of 13 April 1956, VI 347/54, BGHZ 20, 259, 263 et seq –
operational risk.
45 BGH, Judgment of 18 September 1987, V ZR 219/85,NJW-RR 1988, 136, 138.
46 BGH, Judgment of 18 April 1997, V ZR 28/96, BGHZ 135, 235, 239 et seq – roots in the tennis
court.
47 BGH, Judgment of 29 March 1971, III ZR 98/69, BGHZ 56, 57, 63: ‘the legal rationale contained
in Section 254 BGB.’.
48 See A. Meier-Hayoz, Berner Kommentar zum schweizerischen Privatrecht, introduction to
Art. 1–10 Swiss Civil Code (ZGB) (Bern: Stämpfli, 1962) art 1 para 406: ‘One often refers to a legal
norm of broader scope as a general principle of law.’.
49 J. Neuner and E. Wolf, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts (11th ed, Munich: C H Beck,
2016) sec 4 para 49.
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In contrast to other codifications of modern times, however, the BGB mostly
forgoes mentioning principles and doctrines, but rather assumes them. Principles
such as freedom of contract, pacta sunt servanda, the principle of abstraction, or
constructs of reasoning, such as the right to develop the law, were not incorpo-
rated into the BGB or the GG by the German legislator, but were rather assumed.50
As one of the few principles, the concept of property as a right to deal with the
item at will, has been included in Section 903 Sentence 1 BGB.51 Thus, thirdly, it is
possible to establish legal principles by induction, the reasoning from the specific
to the general.52 Thus, one can find principles which are only indirectly inferred
from the law. This is called induction. This derivation is among the most difficult
circumstances in which to determine the legal position. Therefore, principles such
as pacta sunt servandamust be further substantiated (see right below).
2 Substantiation of Legal Principles as a necessary second
Step
However, before principles can be classified, they must be further substantiated.
The primacy of rules over principles is emphasised.53 This correct legal rationale
warrants further discussion. Because legal concepts are abstract, these are pre-
texts and empty phrases without further specification, and are therefore seldom
good for direct classification. Similarly, it may be stated that legal principles also
cannot be used directly as justification as they are too uncertain and thus are yet
unclassifiable.54 Additional interim steps are thus required before utilising legal
principles to resolve cases. The aim is to find a rule which is directly classifiable.
The processes of (a) deduction, and (b) balancing serve this purpose.
50 In contrary, other legal system have codified legal principles to a greater extent, see fn 69 and
fn 75; concerning the development of the law see art 1 schweizerisches ZGB; art 12 para 2 codice
civile, art 4 no 1 Código Civil.
51 A proposal to delete this doctrine was rejected, see Commission’s Report, 4, in B. Mugdan, Die
gesammten Materialien des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs für das Deutsche Reich, volume III (1899)
997. In any event, the definition of property was already in the Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus
Civilis (1759) 2nd ch 2nd part sec 1. On the concept of property in detail, M. Auer, Der privatrechtli-
che Diskurs derModerne (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014).
52 In detail on this, see Aristotle, n 42 above; Bacon, n 42 above. See also Canaris, n 27 above, 97.
53 Neuner, n 49 above, sec 4 para 51.
54 M. Jestaedt,Dasmag in der Theorie richtig sein... (Tübingen:Mohr Siebeck, 2005) 59 et seq calls
for a strict separation between discovering law and producing law; Kramer, n 19 above, 276 calls
for honesty in themethodology for deriving general legal principles.
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a) Substantiation of Legal Principles into Legal Rules or Legal Doctrine
In a second step, it is necessary to specify the general legal principle. This
deduction, that is, reasoning from the general to the specific, can lead to a new
legal rule. Ideally, it develops its own legal doctrine with similar factual condi-
tions. Such a new legal doctrine can be developed by development of the law from
the legal principle. Here, the substantiation is vertical, from the level of the legal
principle to the level of the legal doctrine. Whereas the legal rule, in case of
doubt, only represents an entitlement, the legal doctrine goes beyond this be-
cause it often connects several ideas.55 This is immediately clarified with the
examples of the obligation to contract, price control, and frustration of contract.
The case law specifies the legal doctrines newly developed in this way with
groups of cases and similar factual conditions. They are more than judge-made
law and therefore cannot be abolished by case law.
b) Substantiation through Balancing
The necessary specification of principles can also happen via balancing. For
example, the case law developed numerous interim steps to substantiate the
review of fundamental rights. Fundamental rights are principles.56 The case law
developed numerous interim steps to refine the review of fundamental rights. It is
often a matter of the practical concordance for contrary fundamental rights and
thus conflicting principles. In this case, the substantiation is horizontal because
principles on the same level are balanced with one another.
IV Legal Principles in Private Law: Derivation and
Substantiation of Private Autonomy
In private law, the legal text is frequently more specific than in constitutional law;
the need for legal principles is less intense. However, there are also principles
which must be further substantiated by sub-principles and individual value
judgements.57 In public law, the principles are then substantiated into interim
55 Thus private autonomy includes self-determination, personal responsibility, and the protec-
tion of legitimate expectations, see Canaris, n 15 above, 50 et seq.
56 Alexy, n 16 above, 104.
57 Canaris, n 15 above, 57 et seq.
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stages (Zwischenschritte), review stages (Prüfungsschritte), guiding principles
(Leitbilder). Private autonomy is referred to as an essential basic structure of
contract law.58 A subtle interplay59 of the principle of intention, principle of trust,
and contractual justice as equivalence of benefit and consideration60 and the
principle of a binding contract (pacta sunt servanda) are referred to as legal
principles of contract law. Freedom of contract is the manifestation of private
autonomy.
1 Inductive Derivation of pacta sunt servanda
a) Freedom of Contract as a Consequence of Freedom of Will
Private autonomy includes freedom of contract, but also freedom of ownership
(Section 903 BGB), freedom to marry (Section 1297 BGB) and testamentary free-
dom, thus the right to freely dispose of one’s assets in the event of death
(Section 1937 BGB).61 Freedom of contract in turn includes freedom to conclude
contracts, freedom to choose a contractual partner, freedom of content, and
generally freedom of form, but also freedom to amend and cancel.62 The concept
of freedom of contract was first introduced in the mid-19th century.63 Freedom of
contract is based on the intentions of the parties.64 The parties can determine their
legal relationships between themselves at their discretion, insofar as there are no
conflicting legal provisions.
58 J. Ellenberger, in Palandt BGB, n 39 above, introduction to sec 145 para 4 a et seq.
59 Thus the formulation of Kramer, n 19 above, 104.
60 On the corrective justice of Aristotle see Th. Möllers, Juristische Methodenlehre (Munich:
C H Beck, 2017) sec 1 para 98.
61 Motive, n 2 above, 2.
62 Bork, n 4 above, para 661; Neuner, n 49 above, sec 10 para 33 et seq; Th. Möllers, ‘Themenk-
lausur – Bürgerliches Recht: Der Verbraucherschutz im Zivilrecht’ Juristische Schulung 1999, 1191,
1192.
63 F.C. von Savigny, Das Recht des Obligationenrechts, volume 2 (1853) sec 72–78; B. Wind-
scheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, volume II (8th ed, 1900) sec 312 fn 5 with further citations;
see W. Scherrer, Die geschichtliche Entwicklung des Prinzips der Vertragsfreiheit (Basel: Helbing &
Lichtenhahn, 1948) 33 et seq; J. Rückert, in D. Klippel, Naturrecht im 19. Jahrhundert (Goldbach:
Keip, 1997) 135, 145 et seq.
64 Motive, n 2 above, 126: ‘Legal transaction in the sense of the Draft is a personal declaration of
intent, aimed at emphasising a legal outcome, which occurs under the legal system as a result,
because it is intended.’.
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The parties are generally responsible for agreeing the essentialia negotii, the
essential components of the contract, such as for example, the purchase object
and the purchase price. The price is not controlled. The parties may also conclude
unreasonable contracts.65 That corresponds with the liberal approach of Adam
Smith who described the market as the ‘invisible hand’where demand and supply
regulate themselves.66 The underlying idea is that the conflict of interests between
the parties leads to a correct result through the contract; one refers to the ‘guaran-
teed correctness’ of the negotiation.67 Hobbes accurately stressed that it is the
parties who are best able to determine the value of the item.68 This concept has
been taken up by the BGB. Thus, for example, usury according to Section 138(2)
BGB requires in addition to the conspicuous disparity between benefit and con-
sideration, that freedom of choice is impaired, such as with the exploitation of
plight. This corresponds with the legal position in numerous other legal systems.69
Thus, only procedural fairness was to be ensured, guaranteed process, by protec-
tion against mistake or fraud (Sections 119, 123 et seq, 142 et seq BGB).70
b) The Justification of a binding Contract (pacta sunt servanda)
The counterpart to freedom of contract is the binding contract or contractual
fidelity (pacta sunt servanda). The principle of a binding contract is not of Roman
origin,71 but rather was first developed for all types of contract by canon law, the
65 Higher Regional Court (OLG) of Cologne, Judgment of 8 December 2006, 19 U 109/06, Multi-
media und Recht 2007, 446, 448: Purchase of a sugar beet harvester worth 60,000 euros in an eBay
auction for 51 euros; agreeing,M.-P.Weller,DieVertragstreue (Tübingen:MohrSiebeck, 2009) 170.
66 A. Smith, Wealth of Nations (9th ed, 1799) volume III, book IV, ch II, Of Restraints upon the
Importation from foreign Countries of such Goods as can be produced at Home, 181.
67 W. Schmidt-Rimpler, ‘Grundfragen einer Erneuerung des Vertragsrechts’ Archiv für die civilis-
tische Praxis 147 (1941) 130, 149 et seq; W. Schmidt-Rimpler, ʻZum Vertragsproblemʼ, in Festschrift
Raiser (Tübingen: Mohr, 1974) 3, 5 et seq; M. Lieb, ‘Sonderprivatrecht für Ungleichgewichtslagen?
Überlegungen zum Anwendungsbereich der sogenannten Inhaltskontrolle privatrechtlicher Ver-
träge’Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 178 (1978) 196, 206.
68 Vividly, Th. Hobbes, Leviathan (2nd ed, 1886) part I, ch 15, 74: ‘The value of all things
contracted for, is measured by the appetite of the contractors: and therefore the just value is that
which they be contented to give.’.
69 Art 21 OR (Swiss Code of Obligations); art 282 port cc (Portuguese código civil); art 388 Polish
Civil Code of 23 April 1964.
70 On this procedural concept of fairness, see K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, Einführung in die Rechts-
vergleichung (3rd ed, Tübingen: Mohr, 1996) 320 et seq.
71 Roman law did not have any general option to be able to sue for contractual obligations. See
in detail, G. Kegel,Vertrag und Delikt (Cologne: Heymanns, 2002) 3 et seq.
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late scholasticism, and the natural law72 and German sources of law.73 The
principle is clearly mentioned in the Draft of the BGB,74 but not in the BGB
because the Second Commission assumed that the rule that the concurrence of
wills is contractually binding is well known. Therefore, the Second Commission
deleted it from the Draft.75
As the principle of a binding contract cannot be taken directly from the law
one must derive it indirectly from the law by induction. Thus a person who offers
to conclude a contract with another person is ‘bound by the offer’, Section 145
BGB. The contract and the contractual obligation follow from the deliberate
statement to accept an offer. Without consensus, this leads to disagreement under
Sections 154 et seq BGB. The mistake – the conflict of intention and declaration –
is initially irrelevant for the binding effect. The contract is valid despite the
mistake and only permits a challenge under Sections 119, 142 BGB.76 The binding
contract can be discerned from the synallagmatic fulfilment obligations of the
individual types of contract77 or the general fulfilment obligations on the time of
performance (Section 271 BGB), the right of retention (Section 273 BGB), and
impossibility (Section 275 BGB). Moreover, good faith (Section 242 BGB) is able to
justify the obligation for contractual fidelity.78 Moreover, under the 2001 reform of
the law of obligations, freedom of contract and the binding contract can be
established by Sections 241, 311(1) BGB.79 The binding contract can be derived
from the provisions cited by induction.
72 SeeWolff, n 38 above, sec 438: ‘When two or more jointly agree on one or more promises, it is
a contract (pactum or pactio).’ See K.-P. Nanz, Die Entstehung des allgemeinen Vertragsbegriffs im
16.–18. Jahrhundert (Munich: Schweitzer, 1985) 149 et seq; H. Coing, Europäisches Privatrecht,
volume 1 (Munich: C H Beck, 1985) 397 et seq; in detail, Kegel, n 71 above, 3 et seq.
73 Sachsenspiegel, Leipziger Ausgabe (1595) 1st book, 7th art: ʻThat which a man promises, so
should he keepʼ; Ch.F. von Glück, Ausführliche Erläuterung der Pandekten nach Hellfeld – ein
Kommentar für meine Zuhörer, volume IV (1786) 279 et seqwith reference to the German legal rule:
ʻA man’s word is his bond.ʼ See also F.C. von Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts
(1840) volume III, 309.
74 Sec 77 Entwurf eines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuches für das Deutsche Reich (1888), n 3 above.
75 Commission’s Report, n 3 above. Otherwise the clear rule in art 19 Swiss OR, art 353 Polish
Civil Code, art 1134, 1 cc.
76 S. Hofer, inHKK-BGB, n 37 above, with sec 145 para 10.
77 Such as from the contract of sale (sec 433), rental agreement (sec 535), contract for work
(sec 633) or contract for services (sec 631 BGB).
78 BGH, Judgment of 17 December 1982, V ZR 306/81, BGHZ 86, 167, 171 – increase in a ground
rent in the absence of a contractual adjustment clause.
79 A. Thier, in Historisch-kritischer Kommentar zum BGB (HKK-BGB) (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck,
2007) sec 311 I para 1; Weller, n 65 above, 170.
Working with Legal Principles 115
2 Freedom of Contract and supposedly contradictory Legal
Doctrines
These examples shall clarify the vagueness of describing certain legal institutes
with a precise legal principle.
a) The disputed Justification of the Obligation to Contract in Legal Doctrine
aa) The freedom of contract as freedom to conclude contracts also generally
means that everyone may personally choose his or her contractual partners.
Nevertheless, it is accepted that there must be circumstances in which a contract
must be concluded against the will of one contracting party. What if the only
chemist for miles around is not willing to sell vital medicine to a patient?80 Or
must the theatre critic be permitted to visit the theatre, even if there is reason to
fear that s/he will report negatively on the performance?81 In some cases, the
legislator has set out special legal rules, such as against those with a monopoly
position.82 Further rules arise in anti-trust law for market abuse and the non-
discrimination principle in competition law.83 Moreover, the requirements for
such a claim to conclusion of a contract have been discussed. Such an obligation
to contract must be affirmed when there are no reasonable alternatives, the
customer is dependent on the service, or the refusal is not objectively justified.
bb) There is a lot of dispute regarding legal doctrine and legal methodology.
The case law had originally established the obligation to contract with Sec-
tion 826 BGB because in some cases it was immoral to refuse to conclude a
contract.84 That is unconvincing because a claim to conclude a contract must be
80 Bork, n 4 above, para 666.
81 The Reichsgericht (Imperial Court of Justice, RG) rejected the obligation to contract, Judgment
of 7 Nobember 1931, V 106/31; RGZ 133, 388, 392 – theatre critic.
82 Sec 48 et seq German Federal Lawyer’s Act (BRAO) of 1 August 1959, BGBl I, 565, sec 1, 5(2)
German Compulsory Insurance Act (PflVG), sec 21(2) German Air Traffic Act (LuftVG), sec 22
German Carriage of Persons Act (PBefG) of 8 August 1990, BGBl I, 1690; sec 4(1) sentence 1
German Renewable Energy Act (EEG) of 21 July 2014, BGBl I, 1066, sec 6(1) German Energy
Industry Act (EnWG) of 7 July 2005, BGBl I, 1970; see Ch. Armbrüster, in Erman BGB (14th ed,
Cologne: Schmidt, 2014) with sec 145 para 28.
83 See sec 20(6) German Restriction of Competition Act (GWB) and sec 33 in conjunction with
sec 20(1), 2 GWB.
84 In addition to the RG (n 81 above) also the BGH, Judgment of 2 December 1974, II ZR 78/72,
BGHZ 63, 282, 285 –monopoly organisation’s obligation to include; agreeing, W. Fikentscher and
A. Heinemann, Schuldrecht (11th ed, Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017) para 113; also inclined this way,
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affirmed even without evidence of intent and immorality.85 Alternatively, an over-
all analogy to Article 1(1) and 20(1) GG was derived.86 A third approach seeks to
draw an overall analogy to the provisions of the obligation to contract explicitly
prescribed by law, and connect this to the welfare state principle in Article 20(1)
GG.87 Legal concepts such as justice or legal certainty are too general to derive the
obligation to contract from them.88
b) On the disputed Price Control of Contracts – the laesio enormis
aa) The reasonableness of benefit and consideration can be found as iustitia
commutativa in Aristotle89 (Section 1 Paragraph 98) and also in its early stages in
Roman law.90 In the Middle Ages, the equivalence principle then developed,
which stated that benefit and consideration must be in reasonable proportion to
one another.91 The prohibition on substantial injury (laesio enormis) entitles one
side to cancel the contract when the agreed price accounts for less than half of the
true value (iustum pretium).92 The prohibition of laesio enormis is paternalistic
because it ignores the intentions of the contracting parties. Consequently, the
modern codifications have not adopted the prohibition on laesio enormis.93 The
P. Bydlinski, ‘Zu den dogmatischen Gurndfragen des Kontrahierungszwangs’ Archiv für die civilis-
tische Praxis 180 (1980) 1, 42 et seq.
85 J. Busche, inMünchener Kommentar zum BGB (MünchKomm-BGB) (7th ed, Munich: C H Beck,
2015) with sec 145 para 21; Armbrüster, n 82 above, with sec 145 para 29.
86 Neuner, n 49 above, sec 48 para 13 and sec 10 para 45.
87 Ellenberger, n 58 above, introduction to sec 145 para 10.
88 J. Busche, Privatautonomie und Kontrahierungszwang (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999) 126. For
a different view, L. Raiser, ‘Der Gleichheitsgrundsatz im Privatrecht’ Zeitschrift für das gesamte
Handels- undWirtschaftsrecht (ZHR) 111 (1948) 75, 93 et seq: ‘substantive principle of justice’.
89 Aristotle, n 38 above.
90 C 4.44.2; here, Ch. Becker,Die Lehre von der laesio enormis in der Sicht der heutigenWucherpro-
blematik (Cologne: Heymanns, 1993) 10 et seq; Zimmermann (1992, Law of Obligation), n 37
above, 259 et seq.
91 DecretalesGregoriiP IX,Lib III, TitXVII, Ch III;Azo, In ius civile summa (1564)Tit de rescindenda
venditione No 4, 114: Venditor vel emptor quando censeatur deceptus ultra dimidiam iusti pretij –
Thevendororpurchaser,whenhe shouldbe considered tobedeceivedbyoverhalf of the just price;
Ch.F. vonGlück,AusführlicheErläuterungenderPandekten, volume 17 (1815) 35 et seq.
92 It can even be found in older codifications such as the Codex Maximilianeus bavaricus civilis,
the ALR, the ABGB and the Code Civil, IV part, 3rd ch, sec 19 et seq CMBC; I part, sec 59, 69 ALR;
sec 934 ABGB and art 1674 et seq cc: limited to 3/7 for land contracts; here Zweigert and Kötz, n 70
above, 320.
93 So expressly, Motive, n 2 above, 321: ‘The Draft [...] has removed the right to rescind the
contract of sale due to so-called laesio enormis’.
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BGB does not have any general price controls, but rather requires that freedom of
choice is impaired as a further prerequisite for the facts of usury to be established
in Section 138(2) BGB.
bb) Nonetheless, the BGH frequently imposed price control in the past, eg
when it declared the contract which sold a slot machine worth DM 30,000 for
DM 80,000 to be immoral and thus void in the sense of Section 138(1) BGB.94 In
another decision, the BGH declared a lawyer’s flat-rate fee to be immoral because
it exceeded the statutory fees five fold.95 With an objectively conspicuous dispar-
ity between benefit and consideration, the case law assumes intention to exploit96
and therefore circumvents the prerequisite in Section 138(2) BGB. In part, there-
fore, some refer to a ‘renaissance of the laesio enormis’97 and there is discussion of
contractual justice in the sense of an equivalence between benefit and considera-
tion.98 How do these considerations now connect with the binding contract just
formulated or the principle of private autonomy?
c) Frustration of Contract and clausula rebus sic stantibus
aa) There is a third legal doctrine, which softens the binding contract, the princi-
ple of pacta sunt servanda. The doctrine of clausula rebus sic stantibusmeans that
any contract should only be binding as long as the circumstances that determined
its conclusion have not radically changed.99 It experienced its heyday in modern
94 BGH, Judgment of 26 November 1997, VIII ZR 322/96, BetriebsBerater 1998, 393 – slot machine.
95 BGH, Judgment of 10 November 2016, IX ZR 119/14, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 2017,
2479 para 19 et seq – immorality of a fee agreement with commentary, V. Römermann, Entschei-
dungen zum Wirtschaftsrecht (EWiR) 2017, 45 et seq, which is critical of why even 5 times the
amount should establish immorality.
96 BGH, Judgment of 10 July 1986, III ZR 133/85, BGHZ 98, 174, 178; BGH, Judgment of 19 January
2001, V ZR 437/99, BGHZ 146, 298, 302; Ch. Armbrüster, inMünchKomm-BGB , n 85 above, sec 138
para 154.
97 See the analyses of Th. Mayer-Maly, ʻRenaissance der laesio enormis?ʼ, in Festschrift Larenz
(Munich: C H Beck, 1983) 395, 398 et seq; Th. Finkenauer, ʻZur Renaissance der laesio enormis
beim Kaufvertragʼ, in Festschrift Westermann (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008) 183 et seq.
98 F. J. Säcker, inMünchKomm-BGB , n 85 above, introduction para 38: ‘In my view, this case law
can be generalised, such that agreements are invalid under Section 138(1) if they exceed the
specific normalmarket price for a product or service in the relevant market by 100 %ormore.’.
99 It is already in the Codex Maximilianeus bavaricus civilis and in the ALR, and also in other
legal codes, fourth part, 15th ch sec 12 CMBC: ‘and as [...] all bonds implicitly contain the
Clausulam Rebus sic Stantibus’; first part, fifth title, sec 377–380 ALR; art 24(1) clause 4 and 373
Swiss OR and art 3571 of the Polish Civil Code.
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times.100 Due to its vagueness, the legislator had consciously not included the
doctrine of clausula rebus sic stantibus in the BGB.101 Due to the massive inflation
after the 1stWorldWar, however, the case law thenmade adjustments to contracts.
Whereas the case law originally referred to impossibility102 or economic impossi-
bility,103 it later recognised the doctrine from Oertmann104 of the basis of the
transaction ceasing to exist105 and referred to good faith.106English case law reacted
ina similarwaywith the ‘doctrineof frustrationof the contract,’107while in Italy, the
Netherlands, andGreece the legislator had to assist.108
bb) In the course of time, literature and case law have developed groups of
cases such as disruption of equivalence, disruption of the intended purpose, joint
error of motive, and similar factual conditions within an independent case group
in Section 242 BGB. Firstly, the basis of the transaction must have substantially
changed; secondly, the risk may not be borne unilaterally by one party.109 This
100 A. Leyser, Meditationes ad Pandectas (3rd ed, 1741) vol 1, specimen 40 IV, 411: ‘Omne
pactum, omnis promissio, rebus sic stantibus, intelligenda est’; Zimmermann (1992, Law of
Obligation), n 37 above, 579 et seq. B. Windscheid, Die Lehre des römischen Rechts von der
Voraussetzung (1850), then developed these further.
101 Motive, n 2 above, 249: ʻcurrently does not have that structure and recognitionʼ.
102 RG, Judgment of 6 July 1898, I 174/98,RGZ 42, 114, 116 et seq.
103 RG, Judgment of 23 February 1904, II 398/03, RGZ 57, 116, 118 et seq.
104 P. Oertmann, Die Geschäftsgrundlage (1921); P. Oertmann, ‘Doppelseitiger Irrtum beim Ver-
tragsschlusse’ Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 117 (1919) 275 et seq.
105 RG, Judgment of 3 February 1922, II 640/21, RGZ 103, 328, 332 – Vigognespinnerei; RG,
Judgment of 6 August 1923, II 215/23, RGZ 106, 422, 424 et seq; here K. Luig, in R. Zimmermann,
Rechtsgeschichte und Privatrechtsdogmatik (Heidelberg: Müller, 1999) 171, 185 et seq; R. Meyer-
Pritzl, inHKK-BGB, n 79 above, sec 313–314 para 18 et seq.
106 Even today, see BGH, Judgment of 25 February 1993, VII 24/92, BGHZ 121, 378, 391; Bundes-
tag document no 14/6040, 174. But critical, W. Flume, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts,
volume II (4th ed, Berlin: Springer, 1992) 500: ‘In reality, however, there is nothing to be gained by
referring to “good faith”’.
107 Taylor v Caldwell (1863) 3 B & S 826, 122 ER 309, 312 [833] and the famous coronation case
Krell v Henry (1903) LR 2 KB 740, 754. In the interim, the legislator responded with the Frustrated
Contracts Act 1943 for England and sec 2-615(a) Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) for the USA.
108 Art 1467 et seq. Italian codice civile of 4 April 1942, in France there were only special
provisions for specific problems, see M. Ferid and H. J. Sonnenberger, Das Französische Zivilrecht,
volume 1 (2nd ed, Heidelberg: Verlagsgesellschaft Recht undWirtschaft, 1994) para 1 F 770, 568 et
seq. In the interim, there are also provisions in art 388 Greek civil code, book 6 art 258 Dutch
nieuw burgerlijk wetboek; art 1195 cc. See also art III-1:110 DCFR: change of circumstances.
109 Fundamentally, W. Fikentscher, Die Geschäftsgrundlage als Frage des Vertragsrisikos (Mu-
nich: C H Beck, 1971) 31 et seq, 107 et seq; E. Rabel, Das Recht des Warenkaufs, volume 1 (Berlin:
de Gruyter, 1936) 357; Flume (1960), n 4 above, 208. See BGH, Judgment of 25 February 1993, VII
24/92, BGHZ 121, 378, 392; in detail Meyer-Pritzl, n 105 above, sec 313–314 para 61 et seq.
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needs a delineation of the parties’ areas of risk. And thirdly, the change may not
be one that could be reasonably be expected by the affected party.110 These
features could then be consolidated into factual elements so that the legal
doctrine could be incorporated into the BGB as Section 313 in 2002.111 But how can
the frustration of contract be justified in legal doctrine? It clearly contradicts the
principle of pacta sunt servanda.112
V The Right to Self-Determination as a
Justification for various Legal Doctrines
How can the various legal institutes be explained? To which legal principle can
they be reduced? In this regard, the legal literature contains several views.
1 Approaches in Literature
a) Private Autonomy and contractual Justice
Schmidt-Rimpler represents the view that the negotiation of the essential compo-
nents of the contract by both parties leads to the contract’s ‘guaranteed correct-
ness’.113 However, this view is only partly convincing when stated so generally
because self-determination on both sides is absent when there is an inequality of
power.114 Thus, numerous voices criticised the lack of protection for the weak
110 K. Larenz, Geschäftsgrundlage und Vertragserfüllung, die Bedeutung ʻveränderter Umständeʼ
im Zivilrecht (3rd ed, Munich: C H Beck, 1963); Th. Finkenauer, inMünchener Kommentar zum BGB
(MünchKomm-BGB) (7th ed, Munich: C H Beck, 2016) sec 313 para 56; H. Köhler, ʻDie Lehre von
der Geschäftsgrundlage als Lehre von der Risikobefreiungʼ, in 50 Jahre Bundesgerichtshof: Festga-
be aus der Wissenschaft, volume 1 (Munich: C H Beck, 2000) 295, 297 et seq for a different view
Flume, n 106 above, 520, who calls for intervention by the legislator in circumstances where
equivalence is disrupted.
111 German Modernisation of the Law of Obligations Act (SMG) of 26 November 2001, BGBl I
3138.
112 Fikentscher and Heinemann, n 84 above, para 224.
113 Schmidt-Rimpler (1941), n 67 above, 132 et seq, 152 et seq; Schmidt-Rimpler (1974), n 67
above, 3, 6 et seq; Lieb, n 67 above, 206.
114 Against Schmidt-Rimpler, see Flume (1960), n 4 above, 142 et seq. C.-W. Canaris, Die
Bedeutung der iustitia distributiva im deutschen Vertragsrecht (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen
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when the BGB came into force.115 Many voices claimed a protection of the con-
sumer for s/he is the weaker party.116 Contractual justice is the substantive operat-
ing principle of contract law.117 There are developments to this end in the case law
when price controls are imposed and when the reasonableness of the contract is
extrapolated from the price. The ruling of the BVerfG118 on guarantee agreements
of family members was also accused of not clarifying the extent to which controls
on contracts would be permitted under concepts such as ‘disrupted contractual
parity’ or ‘unequal situation’.119 Contractual justice must be rejected because the
BGB does not provide for any generalised control of the content of contracts.120
However, situations of imbalance are still not sufficient in their own right to
justify price control.
b) Private Autonomy as an Optimisation Requirement
It is to some extent asserted that private autonomy would be an optimisation
requirement which, as with other legal principles, is restricted by other legal
principles.121 Raiser122 and subsequently Neuner123 develop a principle of the
social, based on the constitution, which can restrict freedom of contract. In
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997) 49: ʻonly a prospect of correctnessʼ; L. Fastrich, Richterliche
Inhaltskontrolle im Privatrecht (Munich: C H Beck, 1992) 52 et seq.
115 O. von Gierke, Der Entwurf des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs und das deutsche Recht (1889) 192;
A. Wagner,Grundlegung der politischen Ökonomie, 2nd part (3rd ed, 1894) 99 et seq; A. Menger,Das
bürgerliche Recht und die besitzlosen Volksklassen (1886) 26, 153 et seq.
116 See here S. Atiyah, ‘Contract and fair exchange’ 35 University of Toronto Law Journal 1, 14 et
seq (1985); S. A. Smith, Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract (6th ed, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 2005) 297.
117 See K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung (2nd ed, Tübingen: Mohr,
1984) 7 et seq.
118 BVerfG, decision of 19 October 1993, 1 BvR 567/89 inter alia, BVerfGE 89, 214, 231 et seq –
guarantee contracts.
119 Critical W. Zöllner, ‘Regelungsspielräume im Schuldvertragsrecht’ Archiv für die civilistische
Praxis 196 (1996) 1, 26 et seq, 30; D. Coester-Waltjen, ‘Die Inhaltskontrolle von Verträgen
außerhalb des AGBG’Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 190 (1990) 1, 23.
120 J. Drexl, Die wirtschaftliche Selbstbestimmung des Verbrauchers (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck,
1998) 208; K. Ritgen, ʻVertragsparität und Vertragsfreiheitʼ JuristenZeitung 2002, 114, 119; S. Hofer,
Vertragsfreiheit am Scheideweg (Munich: C H Beck, 2006) 23.
121 Neuner, n 49 above, sec 10 para 30.
122 L. Raiser, ‘Vertragsfreiheit heute’ JuristenZeitung 1958, 1, 6, 8.
123 J. Neuner, Privatrecht und Sozialstaat (Munich: C H Beck, 1999) 237 et seq; Neuner, n 49
above, sec 10 para 42 et seq.
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addition to the obligation to contract, it should also include information require-
ments (such as the instructions on cancellation in Section 355(2) BGB) or the
protection against lack of perspective. For these observations, it can be stated that
the legislator and the case law in the last decades developed the market economy
into a social124 or environmental-social market economy;125 the extensive legisla-
tion in the fields of occupational safety, rental and consumer protection law serve
as proof for this thesis.
However, two considerations indicate otherwise. The principle of the social
does not concern an optimisation of freedom of contract, but rather the preserva-
tion of a minimum level of freedom of contract for the parties. The optimisation
concept suggests that freedom of contract, as with the fundamental rights in
public law, has to be balanced with other rights and brought into a proportional
practical concordance. However, such a concept of balancing cannot be found in
German private law.126 In general, state restraint is required. This accords with the
fundamental liberal ideas of the BGB. As long as the contract is within a certain
tolerable framework the state may not make directive interventions. It is only
when the degree of injustice breaks through these boundaries that the parties’
power of determination transfers to the state. Moreover, fundamental rights only
act indirectly between private actors, eg for the theatre critic, the right to freedom
of expression and freedom of the press.127 It is only for racially-motivated discrimi-
nation that one can appeal to human dignity directly from the GG,128 but not for
the refused journey to the airport.129 The Basic Law is frequently too vague to
derive entitlements from it.130 To justify the journey to the airport, or the desire to
open a current account with human dignity or the welfare state principle, without
124 Möllers, n 62 above, 1192 et seq.
125 Thus the writings of W. Fikentscher, Die umweltsoziale Marktwirtschaft (Heidelberg: Müller,
1991).
126 On the discussion, see in detail Möllers, n 60 above, sec 12 para 93 et seq.
127 R. Bork, in Staudinger, BGB (Neubearb, Berlin: Sellier-de Gruyter, 2015) with sec 145–156
para 23; Neuner, n 49 above, sec 48 para 14. But for a different view, RG, Judgment of 7 November
1931, V 106/31, RGZ 133, 388, 392 –theatre critic, n 81 above.
128 Möllers, n 60 above, sec 7 para 12.
129 It is not the case that any lack of objectivity is discriminatory, similarly Bork, n 4 above,
para 671.
130 Critical of Neuner’s approach, Rückert, n 37 above, with sec 1 para 107 fn 375: ‘improper
attempt to formulate free and social as being generally opposed.’; similarly against returning to
the principle of the social market economy, H. Bartholomeyczik, ‘Äquivalenzprinzip, Waffen-
gleichheit und Gegengewichtsprinzip in der modernen Rechtsentwicklung’ Archiv für die civilis-
tische Praxis 166 (1966) 30, 49.
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a legal basis, would be to use a sledgehammer to crack a nut.131 The principle of
the social promises too much, but it cannot be about ensuring justice, but rather
only preventing gross injustices. One’s priority should therefore be to attempt to
justify the legal doctrine directly with the legal principles of private law and not
with the constitution.
c) Further Approaches to justify Private Autonomy
Legal literature subdivides private autonomy into self-determination, personal
responsibility, and protection of legitimate expectations.132 As attribution criter-
ia, that may be sufficient for a dynamic system. Nevertheless, this does not
explain the determinative element of private autonomy yet. Rückert names the
principle equal legal freedom.133 It was certainly one of the big achievements to
overcome the hierarchical society of the 19th century. However, the principle in
its generality seems to be more of a legal concept than a legal principle. More-
over, when private autonomy and freedom of contract are to some extent
equated in legal literature,134 this is not convincing for the groups of cases
referred to.
2 Private Autonomy as Self-Determination for both Parties
a) Self-Determination of the individuals and mutual Self-Determination
aa) The presentation of the legal doctrine above emphasises freedom of contract
too much. This neglects the essential element of self-determination. Self-determi-
nation is a prerequisite for freedom of contract. The following wording is already
contained in theMotive: ‘The legal system cannot allow free self-determination to
be impaired in legal transactions in an unlawful way.’135 In addition, the first
sentence in Flume’s work ‘Rechtsgeschäft’ reads: ‘Private autonomy is the name
given to the principle of self-organisation of legal relationships by the individual
131 But Neuner, n 49 above, sec 48 para 13 and sec 10 para 45; Ellenberger, n 58 above, intro-
duction to section 145 para 10.
132 Canaris, n 15 above, 50 et seq.
133 Rückert, n 37 above, with sec 1 para 39 et seq, 47, 86 et seq.
134 See Flume, n 106 above, 12; S. Lorenz, Der Schutz vor dem unerwünschten Vertrag (Munich:
C H Beck, 1997) 17; Busche, n 88 above, 13.
135 Motive, n 2 above, 204.
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according to his/her will.’136 He continued verbatim: ‘For as far as self-determina-
tion reaches, there is no external control. The deliberate decision is valid because
it is intended and the will of the individual is respected as such. Private autono-
mous organisation requires, insofar as it is recognised by law, no justification
other than the individual intends.’137
bb) Self-determination is often only referred to in relation to one party to the
contract.138 However, the principle of self-determination apparently applies to
both sides. Self-determination of both sides also means protection against exter-
nal control.139 Flume justifiably emphasises that the contract requires mutual self-
determination and that an inequality of power or factual monopoly position leads
to one-sided external control. The concept of mutual self-determination as part of
private autonomy was met with approval.140 Flume had already stated the follow-
ing in 1960:
‘Insofar as individuals are provided with the right to regulate legal relation-
ships by mutual self-determination, that is, by contract, in our legal system, it is
based on the requirement that the individuals face one another with the power of
self-determination, and do not enter into them by the power of one-sided external
control instead of mutual self-determination. Compulsion and private autonomy
are incompatible with one another. However, it is private autonomy’s eternal
dilemma that it is continually brought into question by an unequal distribution of
power.’141
b) Derivation of the Principle of Self-Determination from the BGB and the
Constitution
This principle can be discerned from an indirect third-party effect of the funda-
mental rights. In the decision on the guarantee for asset-less relatives, the BVerfG
stressed that Article 2(1) GG guarantees the ‘self-determination of the individual
136 Flume, n 106 above, 1; as above Flume (1960), n 4 above, 136 et seq, 143; agreeing Canaris,
n 4 above, 277; Bork, n 4 above, para 99; Rückert, n 37 above, with sec 1 para 108 speaks of
ʻdrumbeatʼ. See also BVerfG, decision of 13 May 1986, 1 BvR 1542/84, BVerfGE 72, 155, 170.
137 Flume (1960), n 4 above, 141.
138 Busche, n 85 above, with sec 145 para 6 and the evidence in sec 12 fn 144; Neuner, n 49
above, sec 10 para 30.
139 N. Reich, ‘Das Phantom «Verbraucherrecht» – Erosion oder Evolution des Privatrechts?’
JuristenZeitung 1997, 609.
140 Säcker, n 98 above, introduction para 37.
141 Flume (1960), n 4 above, 143; similarly K. Larenz, Schuldrecht, volume 1 (14th ed, Munich:
C H Beck, 1987) sec 4, 41: ‘free self-determination of each of the two contracting parties’.
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in legal life’142 as part of private autonomy, and required an understanding of
private autonomy in several decisions, when there would have been a ‘structural
inequality of bargaining power’ or a ‘disrupted contractual parity’.143 In terms of a
constitution-oriented (reinforcing) interpretation, there is nothing to preclude
this.144
However, it is more convincing to interpret the principle of self-determination
as part of the private autonomy of both parties and thus as a private law legal
principle. The BGB expresses this principle through the will theory of the 19th
century, which is standardised in Section 133 (‘to ascertain the true intention’),
the mistake rules (Section 119 et seq). Self-determination is also guaranteed in
family and probate law.145 Seen historically, the BGB did not only want to
introduce freedom, but also an equal legal freedom146 without differentiation
between persons. Through European law, the German legislator also added the
cancellation (Section 312 BGB), which strengthened the self-determination of the
consumer. Equal legal freedom thus means the equal use of freedom for all.
c) Restriction of Self-Determination which restricts Freedom as the
substantiating Standard for Correction of the Contract
Initially, it generally adheres to freedom of contract with its variants. If one
concedes the self-determination of both sides, it can, in certain cases, lead to a
need for external control to be corrected. In the first instance, that justifies
procedural equality of arms.147 Self-determination therefore requires protection
against procedural defects which arise, inter alia, from fraud or duress. The right
of self-determination is thus not only a principle to justify the binding nature of
contracts, but can also correct the binding contract in cases of doubt. If the parties
have bound themselves contractually in a self-determined manner in the first
142 BVerfG, decision of 19 October 1993, 1 BvR 567 inter alia, BVerfGE 89, 214, 231 – guarantee
agreements referring to Erichsen, see H.-U. Erichsen, in J. Isensee an P. Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch
des Staatsrecht, volume VI (Heidelberg: Müller, 1989) sec 152 para 58 et seq, which in fn 195, 197,
again refers to Flume (1960), n 4 above, 143.
143 Moreover, it referred to the welfare state principle (art 20(1), 28(1) sentence 1 GG), see
BVerfGE 89, 214, 231 et seq – guarantee agreements.
144 Möllers, n 60 above, sec 7 para 73.
145 Sec 1821, 1822 in conjunction with 1643 BGB; sec 1901(1) sentence 2 BGB; sec 2064 BGB.
146 Rückert, n 37 above, with sec 1 para 43 et seq, who speaks of a principle of equal legal
freedom; agreeing Hofer, n 120 above, 11.
147 In the ruling over a guarantee of a family member BVerfGE 89, 214, 232 this is already found
in the guiding principle in the concept of ‘inequality of bargaining power’.
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place, the hurdles for correction of the contract are all the higher. Thus, there is
no (subsequent) control of reasonableness in the sense of equitable outcomes (see
right below). The guideline must be the principle that it is not justice, but rather
only injustice which can be the standard for a legal intervention.148 This evokes
the controls on law and regulations through the Radbruch formula.149 In the
words of the BVerfG, it is necessary that the consequences for the losing party are
‘exceptionally onerous’150 and therefore evidently one-sided.151 This theory of the
materialisation of freedom of contract, which reflects on the self-determination of
the individual in the sense of Flume and the BVerfG, is no threat to the private law
company, but is rather a logical development and improvement.152 It must be
decisive that the self-determination acts to restrict freedom, thus gains a certain
weight. This can now be further substantiated for the three legal doctrines
discussed.
3 The doctrinal Legal Justification of the various Legal
Doctrines where the Right of Self-Determination is absent
a) Obligation to Contract and lack of Self-Determination
The obligation to contract can be justified by private autonomy itself. At first
glance, the obligation to contract is opposed to freedom of contract because one
side loses the freedom to conclude contracts referred to above.153 However, that is
only applicable when one only considers the opposing party to the contract, the
party refusing to accept, in isolation. Freedom of contract, however, is a condi-
tioned freedomwhich is aimed at fulfilling mutual interests. If freedom of contract
includes the self-determined decision of both sides, then private autonomy also
allows the freedom to form a contract and thus the right, under certain conditions,
148 C.-W. Canaris, ‘Verfassungs- und europarechtliche Aspekte der Vertragsfreiheit in der Privat-
rechtsgesellschaft’, in Festschrift Lerche (Munich: C H Beck, 1993) 873, 883 et seq; Neuner, n 49
above, sec 10 para 30.
149 G. Radbruch, ‘Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht’ Süddeutsche JuristenZeitung
1946, 105, 107.
150 BVerfG, decision of 19 October 1993, 1 BvR 567, 1044/89, BVerfGE 89, 214, 232 – guarantee
agreements.
151 Ritgen, n 120 above, 119; Hofer, n 120 above, 23.
152 Drexl, n 120 above, 208, 296; on Flume (1960), n 4 above, 143, on the BVerfG (fn 150). For a
different view, expressly Zöllner, n 119 above, 24 et seq.
153 Flume, n 106 above, 611; Neuner, n 123 above, 287: ‘because it hereby involves the opposite
of self-determined legal consequences’.
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to force conclusion of a contract. Freedom of contract is impaired when there is
no choice.154 The reliance on the service clarifies, when there is an obligation to
contract,155 the lack of self-determination. The self-determination of the party
wishing to contract is severely restricted in the absence of alternatives, such that
the self-determination of the other party is, by way of exception, restricted. The
obligation to conclude a contract in this respect establishes a legal obligation
which includes the obligation to give a declaration of intent aimed at the conclu-
sion of a contract.156
b) Price Controls under Section 138(1) BGB for Contracts which intervene in the
self-determined Life with severe freedom-restricting Consequences
aa) Formally, the judgments on price controls157 are not convincing because the
presumption of a reprehensible attitude in the event of a disparity between
benefit and consideration only constitutes an apparent justification158 and fic-
tion.159 In terms of content, such judgments are in contrast with the BGB. The
wording of Section 138(2) BGB requires, along with the need for a conspicuous
disparity, also exploitation of plight and therefore does not directly provide any
general price controls. It is thereby fundamentally left to the contracting parties
to determine the content and extent of the essential components of the contract
(essentialia negotii) and so to specify the price. Moreover, it would be system-
atically inconsistent if an unlawful threat or a fraudulent deception were ‘only’ to
lead to a right to avoid a contract, but a particularly large disparity in benefit
would lead ipso iure to invalidity under Section 138 BGB.160 Furthermore, it would
be counterproductive if anyone were to be able to rely on judicial price control.
The consequence would be a multitude of imprudent contracts.161
154 Thus J. Kohler, Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie (1909) 96. Busche, n 88 above, 125 et seq, in
addition to the legally protected interests, mentions the dependence on the provider.
155 Fastrich speaks of ʻexistential dependenceʼ, n 114 above, 232 et seq. On dependence, see
Schmidt-Rimpler (1941), n 67 above, 157 fn 34.
156 Armbrüster, n 82 above, with sec 145 para 31.
157 See above fn 94 et seq.
158 H. Koziol, ‘Sonderprivatrecht für Konsumentenkredite?’ Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 188
(1988) 183, 207.
159 Th. Mayer-Maly, Das Bewußtsein der Sittenwidrigkeit (Karlsruhe: Müller, 1971) 12; Mayer-
Maly, n 97 above, 400, 404 et seq; Th. Finkenauer, n 97 above, 183, 193.
160 M. Maaß, ‘Grundstückskauf nur noch mit Wertgutachten?’ Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
2001, 3467, 3468; Finkenauer, n 97 above, 205.
161 Bartholomeyczik, n 130 above, 62.
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bb) According to the view represented here, simple contracts of sale or
contracts of service are not subject to the immorality and price control of Sec-
tion 138 BGB.162 Instead of employing an immorality review of the relevant mar-
ket, however, the breach of a duty to inform163 or fault in conclusion of the
contract (culpa in contrahendo) can intervene in such a case.164 The BGH therefore
correctly rejected immorality when a purchaser had acquired collector’s coins at a
price of DM 20,000, and could then only resell them for the value of the metal at
DM 2,250.165 The market and not the judge fundamentally determines the reason-
ableness of the price.
cc) Situations of imbalance can only be relevant when the consequences are
exceptionally onerous and that self-determination is therefore massively im-
paired.166 Contracts restrict the self-determined life when they act to severely
restrict freedom. It is not justice, but rather injustice which is the standard for a
legal intervention. The exploitation of a position of power or the restriction of
freedom are also recognised as grounds for attribution within the general clause
in Section 138 BGB. After conclusion of the contract, one can include cases of loss
of perspective167 or the restriction of freedom in existential areas of life.168 Case
law has already developed groups of cases. For transactions of existential impor-
tance, exceptionally, there is price control. In German law, this is relevant for
rent, the purchase of property, or wages.169 Self-determination, thus, does not
only refer to the exercise of a declaration of intent, but rather also the self-
determined life which should ensure that the wage is generally sufficient to live
on, that tenancy law protects the tenant’s social environment, and the purchase
162 Also opposed, Mayer-Maly, n 97 above, 395, 398 et seq; Finkenauer, n 97 above, 183 et seq;
Rückert, n 37 above, with sec 1 para 112.
163 Thus P. Singer, Comment on BGH, Judgement of 22 December 1999, VII ZR 111/99, Juristen-
Zeitung 2001, 195, 197 against the opinion of the BGH collector’s coin, next note.
164 BGH, Judgment of 22 December 1999, VIII ZR 111/99, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2000,
1254, 1255 – collector’s coin.
165 BGH, Judgment of 22 December 1999, VIII ZR 111/99, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2000,
1254, 1255 – collector’s coin. The hire purchase of pool/billiards equipment at 2.5 times the value
was also not immoral, BGH, Judgment of 24 January 1979, VIII ZR 16/78,Wertpapier-Mitteilungen
1979, 491, 492. See also above, fn 65.
166 See fn 120.
167 For a different view, however, Neuner, n 49 above, sec 10 para 55 et seq, which understands
this as ‘immaterial property rights of the social principle’.
168 W. Enderlein, Rechtspaternalismus und Vertragsrecht (Munich: C H Beck, 1996) 293 et seq.
169 Similar examples in Neuner, n 49 above, sec 46 para 52.
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of a immorally inflated property does not drive the purchaser into the modern
debtors’ prison.170
c) A freedom-restricting Lack of Equivalence as Frustration of Contract
The requirements and groups of cases of frustration of contract were developed
inductively within 80 years. Two key features are crucial. The background is, on
the one hand, again the observation that courts cannot and should not review
equivalence with frustration of contract. On the other hand, an adjustment can be
made to the contract in extreme circumstances only, namely, situations which
were not discernible for the contracting parties on conclusion of the contract and
which massively disrupt the balance of the contract.171 Justice is thus specified as
a legal concept through the principle of self-determination. This specifies the
prerequisites of frustration of contract. The disruption may not fall within one of
the contracting parties’ areas of risk. In the event of a disruption of equivalence, it
requires that the sphere of freedom is existentially impaired. It concerns cases
which are simply incompatible with law and justice.172 The disruptions of equiva-
lence must therefore clearly be more than 50 % of the market price173 and again
have severely restrictive impacts on freedom.
170 A debtors’ prison was a private prison until the late Middle Ages and then a public prison for
people who had not fulfilled their payment obligations, S. Breßler, Schuldknechtschaft und
Schuldturm (Berlin: Duncker &Humblot, 2004) 88, 115 et seq.
171 Bundestag document no 14/6040, 176: ‘gross disparity with the creditor’s interest in perfor-
mance’, C.-W. Canaris, ‘Die Reform des Rechts der Leistungsstörungen’ JuristenZeitung 2001, 499,
502. See BGH, Judgment of 25 February 1993, VII 24/92, BGHZ 121, 378, 393: ‘when it concerns such
a drastic change that adherence to the original provision would lead to an intolerable outcome
which can plainly no longer be reconciled with law and justice, and adherence to the original
contractual provision would therefore be unreasonable for the affected party’. Similarly Weller,
n 65 above, 298 et seq.
172 Thus the formulation in H. Eidenmüller, ‘Der Spinnerei-Fall: Die Lehre von der Geschäfts-
grundlage nach der Rechtsprechung des Reichsgerichts und im Lichte der Schuldrechtsmoderni-
sierung’ Jura 2001, 824, 829; see fn 148.
173 Devaluation by more than 60 %, see BGH, Judgment of 18 September 1992, V 116/91, BGHZ
119, 220, 222 – increase in the ground rent; on this group of cases see H. Kötz, Vertragsrecht
(2nd ed, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012) para 1014 et seq.
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4 The Substantiation and Justification of Legal Doctrines
through the Principle
In terms of doctrinal legal analysis, the legal doctrines just mentioned could be
explained by the principle of self-determination. The principle of self-determina-
tion can thereby justify the legal doctrines developed by the case law, even
though they initially militate against the principles of freedom of contract and the
binding contract. In a first step, the legal principle can be derived inductively. In
a second step, however, the principle of self-determination also helps to deduc-
tively specify the legal doctrine. For example, it also shows limits for price control
and frustration of contract. Eventually, the legal concept of justice also helps to
state the prerequisites of the legal doctrine more precisely. This principle of self-
determination can be illustrated graphically:
Graphic: Principle of self-determination and legal doctrines
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VI Formation of Principles at the European Level
1 Extraction of Principles through Comparative Law
When looking for principles at the European level, a distinction should be made
between the general principles of primary law, which have priority in cases of
doubt, and the principles of European private law, which have no force of
precedence whatsoever and can (only) be used in the context of teleological
considerations.174
a) Reference to the General Principles of law or Constitutional Traditions of the
Member States
General principles of law also serve to fill in gaps in European law. Reference is
often made to the general principles of law which are common to the legal
systems – for example the liability of the Union, Article 340 TFEU. By reference
to provisions of the national Member States, the CJEU can form a general rule
from various provisions by induction.175 By reference to the constitutional tradi-
tions common to the Member States, the CJEU has developed fundamental rights
at a European level,176 now standardised in Article 6(3) TEU,177 and established
the claim for State liability against the Member States. The court has always
emphasised that general principles have to fulfil a duty of developing law.178
Meanwhile, at the European level, in addition to recognising fundamental
rights, it has also recognised general principles of law179 such as legal cer-
174 B. Heiderhoff, Europäisches Privatrecht (4th ed, Heidelberg: Müller, 2016) para 230.
175 For European law, A. Metzger, Extra legem, intra ius: Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze im Euro-
päischen Privatrecht (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009) 25 et seq; J. Basedow, ʻMangold, Audiolux
und die allgemeinen Grundsätze des europäischen Privatrechtsʼ, in Festschrift Hopt (Berlin: de
Gruyter, 2010) 27, 35.
176 ECJ, Judgment of 14 May 1974, 4/73, ECLI:EU:C:1974:51, ECR 1974, 491, para 13 –Nold.
177 Meanwhile, however, the fundamental rights were derived broadly from the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union art 6(1) TEU.
178 ECJ, Judgment of 5 March 1996, C-46/93 inter alia, ECLI:EU:C:1996:79, para 27 – Brasserie du
Pêcheur: Reference to ‘the fundamental principles of the Community legal system and, where
necessary, general principles common to the legal systems of the Member States.’; here F.-Ch.
Schroeder, ‘Die Auslegung des EU-Rechts’ Juristische Schulung 2004, 180, 183 et seq.
179 Generally on the integration of general legal principles in European case law: P. Häberle,
‘Gemeineuropäisches Verfassungsrecht’ Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 1991, 261 et seq;
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tainty180 and protection of legitimate expectations,181 effective legal protection,182
effet utile, and proportionality.183
Interestingly, the CJEU to some extend gives the citizens stronger legal
protection than the fundamental rights of individual Member States, since it
developed the European fundamental rights and general principles of law. For
example, broadly beyond the case law of German courts, the CJEU strengthened
equal rights and particularly women’s rights. This did not only happen with
regard to the level of wage entitlement, but rather also with regard to access to
and obtaining employment.184 With respect to procedural law, the CJEU has
repeatedly stressed that access to the national courts must be guaranteed,185 and
with this principle of effective legal protection restricted the procedural autonomy
P.-Ch. Müller-Graff and E. Riedel (ed), Gemeinsames Verfassungsrecht in der Europäischen Union
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998).
180 ECJ, Judgment of 21 September 1983, 205/85 inter alia, ECLI:EU:C:1983:233, para 30 ‒Milch-
kontor; ECJ, Judgment of 13 February 1996, C-143/93, ECLI:EU:C:1996:45, para 27 ‒ Van Es Douane
Agenten; ECJ, Judgment of 21 February 2006, C-255/02, ECLI:EU:C:2006:121, para 72 –Halifax.
181 ECJ, Judgment of 5 July 1973, 1/73, ECLI:EU:C:1973:78, para 6 et seq – Westzucker; ECJ,
Judgment of 10 September 2009, C-201/08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:539, para 46 – Plantanol.
182 ECJ, Judgment of 15 May 1986, 222/84, ECLI:EU:C:1986:206, para 18 – Johnston; confirmed as
an inherent principle in ECJ, Judgment of 13 March 2007, C-432/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:163, para 37
et seq –Unibet.
183 ECJ, Judgment of 16 July 1956, 8/55, ECLI:EU:C:1956:11 = ECR 1955/1957, 197, 311 – Fédéra-
tion Charbonnière; ECJ, Judgment of 13 December 1979, 44/79, ECLI:EU:C:1979:290, para 23 –
Hauer; P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law (6th ed, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press,
2015) 15.4(b), 551 et seq; U. Kischel, ‘Die Kontrolle der Verhältnismäßigkeit durch den Euro-
päischen Gerichtshof’ Europarecht 2000, 380 et seq; O. Koch, Der Grundsatz der Verhältnis-
mäßigkeit in der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Berlin:
Duncker & Humblot, 2003); J. A. Frowein, ʻDie Herausbildung europäischer Verfassungsprinzi-
pienʼ, in Festschrift Maihofer (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1988) 149, 151; M. Zuleeg and
S. Kadelbach, in R. Schulze, M. Zuleeg and S. Kadelbach, Europarecht (3rd ed, Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 2015) sec 8 para 42 et seq. The legal competence for the principle of proportionality is
found in art 5(4) TEU.
184 ECJ, Judgment of 14 December 1995, C-317/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:438, para 28 – Nolte; ECJ,
Judgment of 11 November 1997, C-409/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:533, para 31 with approving comments,
T. Lenz, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1998, 1619 – Marschall; S. Prechal, ‘Combatting indirect
discrimination in community law context’, 20 Legal Issues of European Integration 81 et seq (1993).
On the influence of the ECJ on the German Federal Labour Court (BAG) concerning impermissible
questions regarding a pregnancy by the ECJ, Judgment of 8 November 1990, C-177/88, ECLI:EU:
C:1990:383, ECR 1990, I-3941 para 24 et seq –Dekker; see BAG, Judgment of 15 October 1992, 2 AZR
227/92, BAGE 71, 252, 255.
185 ECJ, Judgment of 15 October 1987, 222/86, ECLI:EU:C:1987:442, para 14 – Heylens; ECJ,
Judgment of 13 December 1991, C-18/88, ECLI:EU:C:1991:474, para 34 –GB-Inno-BM.
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of the Member States.186 The European Court of Human Rights has, for example,
set higher standards for the requirement for timely legal protection than the
national courts, and therefore declared proceedings of lengthy duration to be
unlawful.187
b) Isolated Codification of European Legal Principles
Meanwhile, the European legislator has stated individual fundamental rights in
the EU Treaty, as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty, and included the 1950 Eur-
opean Declaration of Human Rights, Article 6 TEU. Otherwise, legal principles
(General Principles of Law), as with in the BGB, are also only tenuously standar-
dised in the European Treaties. This is due to the fact that most principles were
first developed by the CJEU before they then found their way into the law. In the
TEU for example, one can find the principle of conferral and the principle of
subsidiarity, Article 5(1)-(3) TEU or the principle of proportionality, Article 5(4)
TEU. However, it is recognised that there are other additional principles, such as
the principle of democracy (Article 2 TEU).
2 General Legal Principles of European Private Law from the
Classification of European Law
a) Difficulties at the European Level
In an attempt to extract general legal principles from primary and secondary
European law, various disadvantages become evident. Firstly, numerous princi-
ples are not standardised at all; secondly, entire areas of law are also only
186 R. Iglesias, ‘Zu den Grenzen verfahrensrechtlicher Autonomie der Mitgliedstaaten bei der
Anwendung des Gemeinschaftsrechts’ Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 1997, 289, 290;
R. Scholz, ‘Zum Verhältnis von europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und nationalem Verwaltungs-
verfahrensrecht’ Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 1998, 261, 262 et seq; C. M. Kakouris, ‘Do the member
states possess judicial procedural «autonomy»?’ 34 Common Market Law Review 1389, 1407 et seq
(1997); A. Cahn, Comment on EuGH, Judgements of 14 December 1995, C-430/93, C-431/93, C-312/
93, Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 1998, 969, 975.
187 J. A. Frowein, in W. Peukert and J. A. Frowein, Europäische MenschenRechtsKonvention:
EMRK-Kommentar (3rd ed, Kehl am Rhein: Engel, 2009) art 6 para 248 et seqwith further citations.
On the requirement for effective legal protection as a common constitutional tradition, see ECJ,
Judgment of 13 March 2007, C-432/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:163, para 37 et seq –Unibet.
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selectively regulated at the European level;188 and thirdly, there is a danger that
the European Union exceeds its competence by extracting a principle, and thus
violates the principle of conferral, Article 5(2) TFEU.189 Finally, the risk of export-
ing one’s own prior understanding must be avoided. Instead, European law must
be interpreted autonomously,190 meaning independent of national understand-
ings. As a consequence of this, the objectives at the European level are not
absolutely identical to the objectives in one’s own Member State.
It is also interesting to note the attempt to develop a European Civil Code, for
example the Draft Common Frame of Reference – DCFR191 from various research
groups, or the (withdrawn) proposal of the Commission for a Common European
Sales Law – CESL.192 Some principles and rules, also known in German law, are
already included in these drafts for European law.193 However, these are all still
legally non-binding.
188 Rittner, ‘Das Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht und die europäische Integration’ JuristenZeitung
1995, 849, 851: ‘An island in the sea of national law’; H. Kötz, ‘Rechtsvereinheitlichung – Nutzen,
Kosten, Methoden, Ziele’ Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 50
(1986) 1, 5 ‘pointillist character’; Th. Möllers, book review of ‘K. Riesenhuber, System und
Prinzipien des Europäischen Vertragsrechtsʼ JuristenZeitung 2004, 1067 et seq.
189 Critical, eg M. Schmidt-Kessel, in K. Riesenhuber, EuropäischeMethodenlehre (3rd ed, Berlin:
de Gruyter, 2015) sec 17 para 43.
190 ECJ, Judgment of 27 January 2005, C-188/03, EU:C:2005:59, para 29 – Junk; ECJ, Judgment of
12 February 1974, C-152/73, EU:C:1974:13, para 5 – Sotgiu; ECJ, Judgment of 3 July 1986, 66/85, EU:
C:1986:284, para 26 et seq – Lawrie-Blum; ECJ, Judgment of 2 July 1996, C-473/93, EU:C:1996:263,
para 26 – Kommission/Luxemburg.
191 Ch. von Bar, E. Clive and H. Schulte-Nölke, Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of
European Private Law (Draft Common Frame of Reference – DCFR), online edition, 2009; accessi-
ble at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/dcfr_outline_edition_en.pdf (accessed 12/
07/2016); see here, eg Schmidt-Kessel, n 189 above, sec 17 para 47 et seq; H. Eidenmüller,
F. Faust, H.Ch. Grigoleit, N. Jansen, G. Wagner and R. Zimmermann, ‘Der Gemeinsame Referenz-
rahmen für das Europäische Privatrecht’ JuristenZeitung 2008, 530 et seq; W. Ernst, ‘Der «Common
Frame of Reference» aus juristischer Sicht’Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 208 (2008), 248 et seq.
192 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common
European Sales Law of 11 October 2011, COM(2011) 635 final; here the contributions of the
extraordinary meeting of private law lecturers, published in Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 212
(2012) 467–852.
193 Cf n 108 above.
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b) Legal Principles of European Private Law
However, it does not seem futile to extract general legal principles at a European
level from European law itself, without having to resort to the law of the Member
States. Some examples illustrate this.
In the literature, the attempt is made to develop general legal principles,194
such as to discern freedom of contract or contractual fidelity (pacta sunt servanda)
from European law.195 This is not straightforward, because neither the Treaties nor
the Charter of Fundamental Rights directly standardise freedom of contract.196
There are only a few judgments that address freedom of contract.197 The EU does,
though, in Article 119 TFEU acknowledge the ‘principle of an open market econo-
my with free competition’; freedom of contract is an essential requirement for
this.198 Freedom of contract aims to strengthen the internal market by dismantling
different legal rules.
194 S. Grundmann (ed), Systembildung und Systemlücken in Kerngebieten des europäischen
Privatrechts (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000) 1 et seq; K. Riesenhuber, System und Prinzipien des
Europäischen Vertragsrechts (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2003) sec 18 with book review Möllers, n 188
above, 1067 et seq; K. Riesenhuber, ‘System and Principles of EC Contract Law’ 3 European Review
of Contract Law 297–322 (2005); generally N. Jansen, ‘Dogmatik, Erkenntnis und Theorie im
europäischen Privatrecht’ Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 2005, 750 et seq; Metzger, n 175
above; N. Reich, General Principles of EU Civil Law (Cambridge: intersentia, 2014); J. W. Rutgers
and P. Sirena, Rules and Principles in European Law (Cambridge: intersentia, 2015).
195 See, eg K. Riesenhuber, ʻDie Inhaltskontrolle von Vereinbarungen über Hauptleistung und
Preis im Europäischen Vertragsrechtʼ, in Gedächtnisschrift Wolf (Munich: C H Beck, 2011) 123, 130
with further citations; Heiderhoff, n 174 above, para 230 et seq.
196 Whereas art 2(1) GG standardises freedom of action, and thus also private autonomy, art 16
et seq Charter of Fundamental Rights only contains the protection of freedom to conduct business;
critical, therefore F. J. Lindner, ‘Fortschritte und Defizite im EU-Grundrechtsschutz, Plädoyer für
eine Optimierung der Europäischen Grundrechtecharta’ Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 2007, 54, 56:
incomplete protection of fundamental rights.
197 ECJ, Judgment of 10 July 1980, 99/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:193, para 16 – Lancôme speaks of
‘legal certainty in contractual matters’.
198 Ch. Schmidt-Leithoff, ʻGedanken über die Privatrechtsordnungen als Grundlage zum EWG-
Vertragʼ, in Festschrift Rittner (Munich: C H Beck, 1991) 597, 604; O. Mülbert, ‘Privatrecht, die EG-
Grundfreiheiten und der Binnenmarkt’ Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht
(ZHR) 159 (1995) 2, 8; see also art II-1:101 – II-1:103 DCFR.
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3 Limits of Legal Development at the European Level
a) Insufficient Justification
As in German law, legal principles must be developed from the applicable law.
When the CJEU elevated the prohibition of age discrimination into a legal princi-
ple in the Mangold decision, and invoked, inter alia, the common constitutional
traditions,199 it was condemned on the basis that such a common tradition did not
exist in the Member States at all.200
b) Conflicting Legal Principles
As in German law, a general principle of law can ultimately conflict with a
particular outcome. Here again, it is important to take account of the protection of
legitimate expectations for the benefit of the citizens. Such a protection of legit-
imate expectations conflicts with the development of the law for horizontal direct
effect of directives.201 This must be taken into consideration as part of the develop-
ment of the law in conformity with the directive.202 However, the principle of
effective legal protection can restrict the principle of legal certainty and the
protection of legitimate expectations. For example, the beneficiary has to refund
an unlawfully acquired state aid several years later, although national law
provides a one-year period for revocation.203
VII Outlook
1. The German Civil Code (BGB), characterised by the Pandectists of the 19th
Century,204 has trained German lawyers in systematic thinking and the associated
199 ECJ, Judgment of 22 November 2005, C-144/04, ECLI:EU:C:2005:709, para 75 – Mangold/
Helm.
200 Critical, inter alia, J. Jans, 34 Legal Issues of European Integration 53, 65 (2007); Basedow,
n 175 above, 27, 34; J. Basedow, ‘Hundert Jahre Rechtsvergleichung’ JuristenZeitung 2016, 269, 275
et seq.
201 ECJ, Judgment of 8 October 1987, 80/86, ECLI:EU:C:1987:431, para 10 – Kolpinghuis.
202 ECJ, Judgment of 4 July 2006, C-212/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:443, para 110 et seq – Adeneler.
203 ECJ, Judgment of 20 March 1997, C-24/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:163, para 37 et seq and 48 et seq –
Alcan – reclaiming state aid.
204 To mention, for example A. F. J. Thibaut, System des Pandektenrechts, 3 volumes (5th ed,
1818); G. F. Puchta, Pandekten (5th ed, 1850); B. Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts,
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legal doctrine and legal principles until today. In order to further develop the law
but also for better understanding, a consolidated doctrine of law with legal
principles is required.205
Legal principles are to be distinguished from legal concepts and the legal
rules.
Legal principles, or the often synonymously used principles of law, are only
partially standardised. They are extracted from the legal system as the totality of
the written and unwritten legal norms and are more than legal concepts. They are
suited to a binding interpretation, and permit a certain generalisation. Legal
principles generally claim normative validity and lead to a presumption of con-
formity. However, they are often not classifiable and require further specification
through legal rules or balancing.
Legal concepts, such as justice, expediency, and legal certainty have a high
level of abstraction. In consequence, they only constitute (unusable) empty
phrases for processing of the case. Legal doctrines are rules with similar factual
conditions.
2. In a first step of concretization, legal principles must be justified by the
applicable law. In a second step, they are to be substantiated as rules. This often
requires inductive and deductive work.
3. Freedom of contract, which can be derived indirectly from various provi-
sions of the BGB, forms an important legal principle in private law. Individual
legal doctrines, such as the obligation to contract, price control, or frustration of
contract, appear to contradict this principle.
4. Neither a review for correctness, a principle of the social, nor the influence
of the constitution can explain the obligation to contract, price control, or frustra-
tion of contract. These legal doctrines can rather be justified by the principle of
self-determination, which is part of private autonomy applicable to both parties.
5. The CJEU has often developed comparative law principles from the Treaties
in a first step. In a second step, these principles must be interpreted indepen-
dently. This includes European fundamental rights, the claim for State liability, or
the principle of effet utile. Legal literature also speaks in favour of the existence of
legal principles at the European level (DCFR, CESL).
3 volumes (7th ed, 1891); H. Dernburg, Pandekten, 3 volumes (4th ed, 1894); F. Regelsberger,
Pandekten (1893); R. Zimmermann, inHKK-BGB, n 37 above, with sec 1 para 6 et seq.
205 Legal doctrine is vividly compared with grammar, without which language, here the legal
norms, cannot be understood, M. Herberger, Dogmatik (Frankfurter/Main: Klostermann, 1981) 37
et seq, 74 et seq, 119, 257 et seqwith extensive references to Roman law; Jansen, n 194 above, 754.
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